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Key points 
 
• In Post Danmark II, the Court held that, in the context of Article 102 TFEU, it is not 
necessary to show that an anticompetitive effect is of a ‘serious’ or ‘appreciable’ nature to 
apply that provision. 
• In this context, the notion of ‘appreciability’ must be distinguished from that of 
‘likelihood’, which refers to the probability of the anticompetitive effects of the practice. 
• The notion must also be distinguished from that of effects as, contrary to what has 
sometimes been suggested, ruling out the need to show the appreciability of an 
anticompetitive effect does not say anything about what an effect is. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In Post Danmark II, the Court of Justice (hereinafter, the ‘Court’) held that it is not justified to set a 
de minimis threshold for practices falling under the scope of Article 102 TFEU.1 Once an 
anticompetitive effect is shown to exist, it is not necessary to establish, in addition, that it is of a 
‘serious’ or an ‘appreciable’ nature. This position is justified, according to the Court, given that 
competition is already weakened by the very presence of the dominant firm.2 It seems difficult to 
dispute this aspect of the ruling, which is in line with the relevant precedents, in particular 
Hoffmann-La Roche.3 The de minimis doctrine dates back to Völk, where the Court held that 
agreements having ‘insignificant effects on the markets’ fall outside of Article 101(1) TFEU.4 
Considering that Völk refers explicitly to the ‘weak position [of] the persons concerned’ as an 
indicator of the (in)appreciable impact of the agreement on competition, it is only reasonable to 
conclude that the de minimis doctrine has no meaningful role to play in the context of Article 102 
TFEU. 
 The purpose of this piece is not to challenge the position taken by the Court in Post Danmark 
II, which seems sound and uncontroversial. The idea is instead to clarify the meaning of the 
concepts of appreciability and de minimis, which are prone to misunderstandings. The fact that the 
Court found it unjustified to set a de minimis threshold in the context of Article 102 TFEU does not 
mean that it is not necessary to show an anticompetitive effect, or that any impact on the market 
structure is sufficient to establish an abuse of a dominant position. There is a risk that the issue of 
appreciability is conflated with other related questions. Contrary to what has been suggested by 
some commentators, the question of whether the de minimis doctrine is applicable in the context of 
Article 102 TFEU is different from the issue of effects itself. The former refers to the significance of 
                                                 
1 Case C-23/14 Post Danmark A/S v Konkurrencerådet, EU:C:2015:651 (‘Post Danmark II’), para 73. 
2 Ibid, para 72. 
3 Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission, EU:C:1979:36, para 123. 
4 Case 5/69 Franz Völk v S.P.R.L. Ets J. Vervaecke, EU:C:1969:35, paras 5-7. 
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restrictive effects, but does not define what these effects are, or should be. Similarly, there is a risk 
of that appreciability and likelihood are mixed up. Post Danmark II is clear in stating that, while 
appreciability need not be established, it is still necessary to show that the practice had, or is likely 
to have, an effect on competition. The coverage of the conduct and whether the dominant firm is an 
unavoidable trading partners are factors that need to be considered in this regard.5 
 It is submitted that the most reasonable interpretation of the issue of de minimis and 
appreciability in the context of Article 102 TFEU is one that is compatible with the analysis of the 
question under Article 101 TFEU. It would be illogical if these concepts had a different meaning 
depending on the provision at stake. Several issues become clear when one examines how the de 
minimis doctrine is interpreted and applied under Article 101 TFEU. First of all, agreements that 
restrict competition by object are deemed to have appreciable effects on competition where they 
affect trade between Member States. As a result, the de minimis doctrine has no practical role to play 
in relation to conduct that is deemed anticompetitive by its very nature. Secondly, a practice does 
not necessarily have restrictive effects simply because the firms involved in it have a significant 
degree of market power. Even when market power is found to exist, a restriction of competition will 
have to be established, on a case-by-case basis, in light of the nature of the product, the features of 
the relevant market and the coverage of the practices. These were the factors identified by the Court 
both in Delimitis (an Article 101 TFEU case) and Post Danmark II (an Article 102 TFEU case). 
 The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First of all, it explains why the issue of 
appreciability need not be confused with the question of whether it is necessary to establish an 
anticompetitive effect in the first place. This distinction is important in the context of both Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU. Secondly, it distinguishes between appreciability and likelihood. It shows why a 
practice implemented by a dominant firm may fall outside the scope of Article 102 TFEU where it is 
                                                 
5 Post Danmark II (n 1), para 67: ‘[…] only dominant undertakings whose conduct is likely to have an anti-
competitive effect on the market fall within the scope of Article [102 TFEU]’; para 40; and para 46: ‘[…] the fact that 
a rebate scheme, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, covers the majority of customers on the market may 
constitute a useful indication as to the extent of that practice and its impact on the market, which may bear out the 
likelihood of an anti-competitive exclusionary effect’. 
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unlikely to have an anticompetitive effect. The fact that is not necessary to establish the 
appreciability of such an effect is not a relevant factor in this regard. Again, this question is 
explained by identifying the issues that are common to abusive practices and restrictive agreements. 
Finally, the paper seeks to distinguish between the assessment of appreciability and the issue of 
effects as such. 
 
2. Appreciability and the need to establish anticompetitive effects 
 
It may not be easy to distinguish between the issue of appreciability, on the one hand, and the need 
to establish the anticompetitive effects of potentially abusive behaviour, on the other. Because the 
Court held that it is not necessary to show that the exclusionary effects of potentially abusive 
conduct are appreciable, one could argue that it is not really necessary to establish these effects in 
practice and on a case-by-case basis. According to this interpretation of the case law, the mere fact 
that the conduct is capable of having an exclusionary impact would be sufficient to trigger the 
application of Article 102 TFEU. An analysis of the case law suggests that this conclusion is only 
appropriate for practices that are abusive by their very nature (or ‘by object’). Where evidence of an 
anticompetitive effect is a prerequisite to trigger the prohibition, a case-by-case assessment of the 
effects of the practice is necessary. 
 
2.1.Appreciability in ‘by object’ practices 
 
Where a practice is found to restrict competition ‘by object’, its impact is deemed appreciable if the 
other conditions that are necessary to trigger the prohibition are fulfilled. This is true under both 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Thus, if a ‘by object’ agreement between two undertakings is found to 
have an effect on trade between Member States, it is caught by Article 101(1) TFEU without it being 
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necessary to show that it has an appreciable impact on competition.6 According to the case law, it is 
sufficient that it is ‘capable’ of having restrictive effects.7 The question of whether the ‘capability’ 
threshold is met can be inferred from an analysis of the nature of the agreement and of the economic 
and legal context of which it is part.8 Insofar as ‘object’ and ‘effect’ are alternative conditions in the 
context of Article 101(1) TFEU, it seems only logical to rule out the need to establish the 
significance of the effects when a practice is deemed restrictive by its very nature.9 The fact that the 
agreement is capable of affecting trade between Member States would be sufficient to show that its 
impact is appreciable enough to trigger intervention under EU competition law. 
 There are also some practices that are abusive by their very nature under Article 102 TFEU. 
This category comprises conduct such as exclusive dealing,10 loyalty rebates11 and tying.12 As is 
true of agreements that restrict competition by object, these practices are prohibited without it being 
necessary to show that they have a restrictive effect on competition. By the same token, a dominant 
firm cannot avoid the application of Article 102 TFEU by claiming that the practice only had (or is 
only likely to have) insignificant effects on competition. This line of argument has been 
unambiguously rejected by the EU courts. In Michelin II, the General Court (hereinafter, the ‘GC’) 
relied explicitly on the concepts of object and effect and held that once the former is established, it is 
not necessary to evaluate the latter. According to the GC, conduct that has an anticompetitive object 
                                                 
6 Case C-226/11 Expedia Inc. v Autorité de la concurrence and Others, EU:C:2012:795. 
7 Case C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherlands BV, KPN Mobile NV, Orange Nederland NV and Vodafone Libertel NV v Raad 
van bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit, EU:C:2009:343, para 31. 
8 For two recent examples, see Case C-286/13 P Dole Food Company, Inc. and Dole Fresh Fruit Europe v 
Commission, EU:C:2015:184 (‘Bananas’); and Case C-373/14 P Toshiba Corporation v European Commission, 
EU:C:2016:26. On the other hand, it is always possible for the parties to put forward evidence showing why the 
agreement is not capable of restricting competition in the economic and legal context of which it is part. See in this 
sense Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 Football Association Premier League Ltd and Others v QC Leisure and 
Others and Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd, EU:C:2011:631 (‘Murphy’), para 143. 
9 For an explanation of this question, see the Opinion of AG Kokott in Case C-226/11 Expedia Inc. v Autorité de la 
concurrence and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2012:544. 
10 Hoffmann-La Roche (n 3), paras 89-90. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Case T-30/89 Hilti AG v Commission, EU:T:1991:70 ; and Case T-83/91 Tetra Pak International SA v Commission, 
EU:T:1994:246. 
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is also capable of having such effects.13 Similarly, the Court rejected in Tomra arguments relating to 
the ability of rivals to remain on the market.14 
 The practical consequence of the position of the Court in Tomra is that exclusive dealing 
obligations, or a system of loyalty rebates, would be prohibited even when they are very unlikely 
to have exclusionary effects. Suffice it to mention an extreme example in this sense. When 
implemented by a dominant firm, the abovementioned practices are prima facie abusive even 
when they cover just 1% of the market. This outcome has been criticised by some authors.15 
However, it is consistent with the position of the Court in the context of Article 101(1) TFEU. 
There are examples in the case law that show that an agreement that restricts competition ‘by 
object’ is prohibited even when there are reasons to believe that it is unlikely to have restrictive 
effects on competition. A recent example is Bananas, where the Court confirmed a Commission 
decision finding that an exchange of information capable of removing uncertainty about rivals’ 
behaviour is caught by Article 101(1) TFEU by its very nature. This is so even when the 
employees involved in the practice are not responsible for setting quotation prices and even when 
the information is far removed from actual prices.16 More generally, ‘by object’ conduct is 
prohibited even when it is not implemented.17 
 
2.2.Appreciability in ‘by effect’ practices 
 
Where an agreement is not restrictive of competition by object, it is necessary to establish that it has 
restrictive effects within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU. It is in this context that the issue of 
                                                 
13 Case T-203/01 Manufacture française des pneumatiques Michelin v Commission, EU:T:2003:250 (‘Michelin II’), 
para 241. 
14 Case C-549/10 P Tomra Systems ASA and Others v European Commission, EU:C:2012:221, para 42. 
15 See in particular Richard Whish, ‘Intel v Commission: Keep Calm and Carry on!’ (2015) 6 Journal of European 
Competition Law & Practice 1. 
16 See Bananas (n 8), paras 111-135. 
17 For an overview of the case law, see Vivien Rose and David Bailey (eds), Bellamy and Child: European Union Law 
of Competition (7th edn, Oxford University Press 2013), para 2.115. 
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appreciability becomes a relevant one. If the agreement has only an insignificant impact on 
competition, it is not caught by the prohibition. The case law suggests that the analysis of the 
appreciable effects of an agreement comprises two distinct dimensions: a first dimension relating to 
the position of the parties on the relevant market and a second one relating to the actual or likely 
impact of the practice on competition. These two dimensions are nowhere as clearly defined as in 
Delimitis. The Court ruled in that case that the compatibility of an exclusive dealing agreement with 
Article 101(1) TFEU must consider, first, whether access to the market is foreclosed to a new 
entrant (that is, the impact of the practice on competition), and, second, whether the supplier in 
question makes an appreciable contribution to market foreclosure (that is, whether it enjoys 
significant market power).18  
The first dimension, which is the one to which the Court referred in Völk, is useful to identify 
those agreements that are unlikely to have appreciable restrictive effects on competition. In this 
sense, it is negative in nature. In other words, it makes it possible to define what an appreciable 
restriction is not (as opposed to what it is). The Commission has developed a set of presumptions in 
order to provide clarity about its enforcement priorities in relation to agreements of minor 
importance.19 The instruments issued by the Commission rely upon the market share of the parties 
as a proxy for their degree of market power and thus for the likely impact of the practice on 
competition. For instance, an agreement between non-competitors is presumed to fall outside the 
scope of Article 101(1) TFEU where the joint market share of the parties is below 10%.20 The 
Commission has defined higher, more specific, thresholds for various categories of potentially 
restrictive conduct. The current approach to block exemptions is based on the idea that, where the 
market share of the parties falls below the threshold defined in the Regulation, an agreement that is 
                                                 
18 Case C-234/89 Stergios Delimitis v Henninger Bräu AG, EU:C:1991:91, paras 19-26. 
19 Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under Article 101(1) of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (De Minimis Notice) [2014] 2014 C291/1. 
20 Ibid, para 8. 
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not restrictive by object is unlikely to have appreciable effects on competition.21 The presumption 
on which this first dimension is based can be reversed in certain instances. The Commission refers 
in its soft law instruments to situations in which the cumulative effects of several practices lead to 
market foreclosure.22 
 The second dimension of the analysis comes into play when the market share thresholds are 
exceeded. According to the case law, an agreement may fall outside the scope of Article 101(1) 
TFEU even when the market share of the parties is above the threshold defined by the Commission 
in its De minimis Notice or in the guidelines and regulations.23 As the example of Delimitis shows, 
the assessment of this second dimension requires an evaluation of the practice, the nature of the 
product, the features of the relevant market and the position of the parties and its rivals therein. In 
Gøttrup-Klim, for instance, the Court noted that a joint purchasing agreement may not appreciably 
restrict competition where the parties are relatively small, face strong suppliers and rivals and the 
prices of the products vary with the volume of orders.24 Similarly, in Maxima Latvija, which 
concerned – in essence – a non-compete obligation, the Court held that it is necessary to consider 
whether there are ‘real concrete possibilities’ for a competing operator to enter or to remain on the 
market in light of the economic and legal context as well as the duration of the contractual 
obligations.25 
 Against this background, it seems easy to make sense of Article 102 TFEU case law. In the 
same way that some agreements are not restrictive by object, some potentially abusive practices are 
not prima facie prohibited by their very nature. This category comprises, for instance, the 
standardised rebate scheme examined by the Court in Post Danmark II and the ‘margin squeeze’ at 
                                                 
21 See in particular Guidelines on vertical restraints [2010] OJ C130/1, paras 96-99. 
22 De Minimis Notice (n 19), para 10; and Guidelines on vertical restraints (n 21), paras 74-85. 
23 See Expedia (n 6), para 22; which refers to Joined Cases C-215/96 and C-216/96 Carlo Bagnasco and Others v 
Banca Popolare di Novara soc. coop. arl. and Cassa di Risparmio di Genova e Imperia SpA, EU:C:1999:12, para 35. 
24 Case C-250/92 Gøttrup-Klim e.a. Grovvareforeninger v Dansk Landbrugs Grovvareselskab AmbA, EU:C:1994:413, 
paras 31-32. 
25 Case C-345/14 SIA ‘Maxima Latvija’ v Konkurences padome, EU:C:2015:784, para 27. 
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stake in Deutsche Telekom and TeliaSonera.26 Because ‘by effect’ practices are only prohibited 
insofar as they have an exclusionary impact, the issue of appreciability is potentially relevant in such 
cases. In Post Danmark II, however, the Court ruled that it is unjustified to set a de minimis 
threshold in Article 102 TFEU cases, or to show that the effects are serious or appreciable. This 
reference in the judgment is best understood as referring to the first dimension of the analysis (that 
is, the market position of the dominant firm), which should not be conflated with the second. 
Seen from this perspective, the conclusion drawn by the Court in Post Danmark II appears to 
be sound. Where an undertaking enjoys a dominant position, the conditions of competition on the 
relevant market are already weakened. In such circumstances (in which the market share of the firm 
will at least exceed 40% and, typically, 50%), it cannot be presumed that the practices implemented 
by the firm are unlikely to have restrictive effects on competition. As a result, a case-by-case 
assessment of the second dimension (that is, an evaluation of the economic and legal context of the 
behaviour, and of the position of suppliers and rivals) becomes necessary. The need to consider the 
exclusionary effects on a case-by-case basis was in fact emphasised in Post Danmark II. The Court 
referred, inter alia, to the regulatory framework, the status and position of the dominant firm and the 
coverage of the practice. This is also true of prior case law. In Deutsche Telekom, for instance, it 
noted that access to the incumbent’s infrastructure was indispensable to compete on the relevant 
downstream market and that the practice was likely to have exclusionary effects as a result.27  
Post Danmark II reflects the approach taken by the Commission in the context of Article 
101(1) TFEU, and is compatible with it. Suffice it to mention an example to illustrate this idea. It is 
explained in the Guidelines on vertical restraints that a distribution agreement does not necessarily 
have restrictive effects on competition simply because the market share of the seller and the buyer 
exceeds the 30% threshold set in the Regulation.28 This agreement would be above the level below 
                                                 
26 Case C-280/08 P Deutsche Telekom AG v Commission, EU:C:2010:603, paras 250-251; and Case C-52/09 
Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige AB, EU:C:2011:83, para 64. 
27 Deutsche Telekom (n 26), para 255. 
28 See Article 3 of Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 
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which restrictive effects are presumed not to exist. However, it may fall outside the scope of Article 
101(1) TFEU altogether. This would be the case where a case-by-case analysis (that is, an analysis 
of the second dimension referred to above) reveals that it is unlikely to have a negative impact on 
competition. Conversely, if the agreement involving two firms with such a degree of market power 
is found to have restrictive effects on competition, these effects will be appreciable.  
 
3. Appreciability and likelihood 
 
According to well-established case law, intervention under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU can take 
place before anticompetitive effects are materialised. From a temporal standpoint, it is sufficient to 
show that the restrictive impact of the practice is potential.29 This aspect of the case law seems 
uncontroversial. There would be little point in having an EU competition law system if it were 
necessary to wait until the exclusion of rivals for intervention to take place.30 One should note, on 
the other hand, that prospective intervention raises a number of substantive issues. In particular, it 
makes it necessary to define the standard of effects that triggers intervention. Depending on the level 
that is set in this regard, the scope of the prohibition will be narrower or broader. There is indeed a 
significant difference between claiming that a potential anticompetitive effect is plausible and 
arguing that it is likely to materialise.  
As the case law stands, a standard of likelihood or of plausibility applies depending on the 
nature of the practice. The definition of the relevant threshold is further complicated by the fact that 
it is an issue that may be conflated with that of appreciability. There is a tendency by commentators 
                                                                                                                                                               
of 20 April 2010 
on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical 
agreements and concerted practices [2010] OJ L102/1; and, in particular, Guidelines on vertical restraints (n 21), para 
96: ‘[…] there is no presumption that agreements falling outside the scope of the block exemption because the market 
share threshold is exceeded fall within the scope of Article 101(1) or fail to satisfy the conditions of Article 101(3)’. 
29 See Post Danmark II (n 1), para 66; which refers in turn to TeliaSonera (n 26), para 64. In relation to Article 101 
TFEU, see Case C-7-95 P John Deere Ltd v Commission, EU:C:1998:256, para 77. 
30 Case T-201/04 Microsoft v Commission, EU:T:2007:289, para 561; and Case T-219/99, British Airways plc v 
Commission, EU:T:2003:343, para 297. 
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to assume that it is not necessary to evaluate the likelihood of an anticompetitive effect because the 
Court ruled in Post Danmark II that it is not necessary to establish its serious or appreciable nature. 
As will be argued in greater detail below, these are separate questions. It is not because the de 
minimis doctrine is of no practical relevance in the context of Article 102 TFEU that it is not 
necessary to carry out an analysis of the likely effects of the practice. This is an issue that transpires 
from the case law, and which Post Danmark II contributed to clarify by making it explicit. 
 
3.1.Standards of effects: capability and likelihood 
 
As already pointed out above, the fact that a practice is capable of having restrictive effects on 
competition does not necessarily mean that it is likely to do so. A reading of the case law suggests 
that a practice meets the ‘capability’ standard where it is deemed plausible, in light of the 
economic and legal context of which it is part, that it will have a negative impact on competition. 
For instance, the Court has conceded that it is plausible that a set of exclusive dealing obligations 
has restrictive effects on competition.31 Similarly, it is plausible that a policy of below-cost pricing 
by a dominant firm – or a ‘margin squeeze’ – leads to the exclusion of equally efficient rivals.32 
As far as agreements are concerned, it is plausible that an exchange of information between rivals 
concerning one or more parameters of competition allow them to coordinate their behaviour.33 It 
has already been pointed out that the most common categories of conduct are known to be capable 
of having restrictive effects. As a result, they can be safely assumed to meet this standard, unless 
there are factors pertaining to the economic and legal context of the practice that lead to the 
opposite conclusion. 
 The standard of likelihood is higher. As explained by Advocate General Kokott in Post 
Danmark II, this threshold is met where it can be shown that the practice is ‘more likely than not’ to 
                                                 
31 Hoffmann-La Roche (n 3), para 90; and Maxima Latvija (n 25), para 22. 
32 Case C-62/86 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission, EU:C:1991:286, para 72; and Deutsche Telekom (n 26), para 183. 
33 T-Mobile (n 7), para 41; and Bananas (n 8), para 122. 
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have a negative impact on competition.34 In other words, it is necessary to establish that the 
probability of an anticompetitive effect is above 50%. As a result, it seems indispensable to engage 
in a case-by-case assessment of the restrictive impact of the practice. As a logical corollary, it is also 
necessary to establish a causal link between the contentious behaviour and the effects alleged.35 The 
factors that need to be taken into consideration when assessing the impact of the practice on 
competition have already been mentioned. They include, inter alia, the coverage of the practice and 
the ease with which rivals are able to enter and remain on the market. Thus, if the practice does not 
prevent rivals from doing so, it is unlikely to have restrictive effects. 
 The difference between capability and likelihood is perhaps best illustrated by reference to 
two concrete examples. It is plausible, for instance, that an exclusive dealing agreement that covers 
just 1% of the market has restrictive effects on competition if it is implemented by a dominant firm. 
Such effects, however, are improbable. A practice with such limited coverage cannot be expected to 
prevent rivals from thriving and competing on the merits. As a result, it would not meet the 
threshold of likelihood. Similarly, it has also been mentioned that a below-cost pricing campaign by 
a dominant is capable of having exclusionary effects. Such an outcome, in other words, is plausible. 
However, it is not always a likely one, as the case law and administrative practice shows. As 
explained by the Commission in its Guidance on exclusionary abuses, the likelihood of an 
anticompetitive effect depends, inter alia, on the position of the firm implementing the below-cost 
pricing campaign and on the features of the relevant market.36 It has long been understood that 
predation is only likely to lead to the permanent exclusion of rivals when some relatively strict 
conditions are met.37 The case law provides concrete evidence in this sense. In Post Danmark I, for 
instance, the Court noted that the main rival of the dominant firm had been able to endure the below-
                                                 
34 Opinion of AG Kokott in Case C-23/14 Post Danmark A/S v Konkurrencerådet, EU:C:2015:343 (‘Post Danmark 
II’), para 82. 
35 Post Danmark II (n 1), para 47. 
36 Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive 
exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C45/7, paras 67-73. 
37 EAGCP, ‘An economic approach to Article 82’ (July 2005), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/economist/eagcp_july_21_05.pdf, pp. 50-53. 
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cost pricing campaign, to keep its network and even to gain back the customers it had initially lost as 
a result of the strategy.38 More generally, the Court suggested that, where the prices charged by the 
dominant firm are below average total costs but above average variable costs, it is unlikely that 
equally efficient rivals will be driven out of the market.39 
 The difference between capability and likelihood is an important one in practice. As 
explained above, where a practice is restrictive of competition by object (whether under Article 101 
or 102 TFEU), it is sufficient that it is ‘capable’ of having a negative impact on competition. The 
stricter standard – likelihood – applies where it is necessary to show, on a case-by-case basis, the 
restrictive effects of a practice (the standard applies, in other words, to ‘by effect’ conduct). The 
Court, in line with the position of the Advocate General, endorsed a threshold of likelihood in Post 
Danmark II. This judgment is valuable in that the national court expressly asked for clarification 
about the relevant standard of effects. In any event, it was possible to infer from prior case law on 
‘by effect’ practices that the relevant threshold is one of likelihood, in particular from Post Danmark 
I40 and TeliaSonera.41 
 
3.2.The tendency to conflate appreciability and likelihood 
 
In the aftermath of Post Danmark II and the Intel judgment of the GC, there has been a tendency to 
conflate the issue of appreciability with the need to establish the likelihood of an anticompetitive 
effect. Whish, for instance, has regretted the fact that the EU courts refuse to set a de minimis 
                                                 
38 Case C-209/10 Post Danmark A/S v Konkurrencerådet, EU:C:2012:172 (‘Post Danmark I’), para 39: ‘[...] it is 
worth noting that it appears from the documents before the Court that Forbruger-Kontakt managed to maintain its 
distribution network despite losing the volume of mail related to the three customers involved and managed, in 2007, 
to win back the Coop group’s custom and, since then, that of the Spar group’. 
39 Ibid, para 38: ‘to the extent that a dominant undertaking sets its prices at a level covering the great bulk of the costs 
attributable to the supply of the goods or services in question, it will, as a general rule, be possible for a competitor as 
efficient as that undertaking to compete with those prices without suffering losses that are unsustainable in the long 
term’. 
40 Ibid, para 44, which refers to a pricing policy that ‘produces an actual or likely exclusionary effect’. 
41 TeliaSonera (n 26), para 67: ‘[…] it is for the referring court to examine whether the effect of TeliaSonera’s pricing 
practice was likely to hinder the ability of competitors at least as efficient as itself to trade on the retail market’. 
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threshold for some categories of potentially abusive conduct.42 It would seem that this line of 
criticism does not really refer to the issue of appreciability. What Whish calls an ‘abuse of minor 
importance’ seems to be a practice that is unlikely to have restrictive effects on competition. Coming 
back to the example used above, it would be an instance in which the coverage of the practice would 
limited to 1% of the market. The question of whether this ‘abuse of minor importance’ is prohibited 
depends on the applicable standard. 
If the standard of likelihood applies to the behaviour, Article 102 TFEU would not come into 
play in such a case. Contrary to what this author suggests, the very limited coverage of the practice 
would rule out a finding of abuse. For instance, a standardised rebate scheme such as the one 
examined in Post Danmark II would fail to meet the threshold of likelihood (and would thus fall 
outside the scope of Article 102 TFEU) if its coverage were limited to 1% of the market. The fact 
that the Court does not find it justified to set a de minimis threshold for potentially abusive practices 
does not alter this conclusion. The same would be true of other ‘by effect’ abuses such as ‘margin 
squeeze’ practices and selective price cuts. In TeliaSonera, for instance, the Court suggested that it 
is less likely that a ‘margin squeeze’ will have exclusionary effects where access to the 
infrastructure of the dominant firm is not indispensable for downstream rivals, even though such 
effects could not be ruled out.43 
 Authors like Whish regret, it would seem, not so much the rejection of the de minimis 
doctrine in the context of Article 102 TFEU but the fact that some practices are deemed abusive by 
their very nature. He appears to suggest that the ‘by object’ label is not appropriate for practices 
such as exclusive dealing and loyalty rebates, both of which are prohibited irrespective of the effects 
they produce. When he argues that ‘abuses of minor importance’ should be left outside of the 
prohibition, Whish appears to be claiming, in reality, that a standard of likelihood – as opposed to 
capability – should apply to these practices. There is definitely merit to this position. It can be 
                                                 
42 Whish (n 15). 
43 TeliaSonera (n 26), paras 69-72. 
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convincingly argued that the standard of capability is not appropriate for exclusive dealing and 
loyalty rebates. These are practices that may have pro- or anticompetitive effects depending on the 
context in which they are implemented. In this sense, they are fundamentally different from cartels, 
which are known to lack any redeeming virtues.44 This discussion, however, has little to do with the 
issue of appreciability and the de minimis doctrine. 
 At the time of writing, the convenience of the application of the ‘by object’ label to exclusive 
dealing and loyalty rebates is being examined by the Court in the pending Intel case.45 If the Court 
decides to change its case law, the standard of likelihood will apply to these practices. As a result, 
what Whish calls an ‘abuse of minor importance’ would no longer be caught by Article 102 TFEU. 
For as long as exclusive dealing and loyalty rebates fall under the ‘by object’ label, however, the 
Court cannot be criticised for prohibiting prima facie these practices, even when they are of ‘minor 
importance’. The position of the Court is consistent with its general approach to ‘by object’ conduct, 
which is deemed to infringe EU competition law irrespective of its impact on competition. As 
Bananas shows, a ‘by object’ infringement falls within the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU even when 
it concerns an exchange of information of ‘minor importance’ or when it is unlikely to have a 
negative impact on competition. 
 
4. Appreciability and the meaning of ‘anticompetitive effects’ 
 
It has been explained above that the issue of appreciability tends to be conflated with the question 
of whether it is necessary to establish an anticompetitive effect. There is another related confusion 
that needs to be addressed. Even if one accepts that effects and appreciability are separate matters, 
it is still necessary to define what effects are. An anticompetitive effect can mean many different 
                                                 
44 See in this sense Luc Peeperkorn, ‘Defining “by object” restrictions’ (2015) Concurrences 40; and Pablo Ibáñez 
Colomo, ‘Beyond the “More Economics-Based Approach”: A Legal Perspective on Article 102 TFEU Case Law’ 
(2016) 53 Common Market Law Review 709. 
45 Case C-413/14 P Intel Corp v Commission, pending. 
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things, from a disadvantage to rivals to harm to consumer or total welfare. Determining the 
meaning of this concept is different from the issue of appreciability. However, it tends to be 
conflated with it. Since the Court has ruled that it is not necessary to show that an anticompetitive 
effect is of a serious or appreciable nature, one could argue that any impact on competition is 
sufficient to trigger the application of Article 102 TFEU. This section explores the many meanings 
that can be attached to the notion of effects, and how this question must be distinguished from that 
of appreciability. The logical consequence is, again, that effects need to be established, on a case-
by-case basis, in relation to practices that are not abusive ‘by object’. 
 
4.1.The many meanings of effects 
 
It cannot be disputed that some practices are only abusive where they have, or are likely to have, an 
anticompetitive effect. However, there is not much guidance in the case law about the meaning of 
the very notion of effect. In spite of the importance of the matter, it is only possible to have any 
certainty about what it is not. To begin which, an anticompetitive effect cannot be equated with a 
decrease in consumer welfare. EU competition law is not only concerned with practices that harm 
consumers in a direct way – including excessive pricing – and those that harm them indirectly, 
through their impact on the market structure.46 As a result, an exclusionary practice may be 
prohibited even when there is no evidence that consumers have been made – or are likely to be made 
– worse off as a result. Another principle that stems from the case law is that the exclusion of less 
efficient competitors – that is, of firms that are less attractive in terms of price, quality or innovation 
– is not, as a rule, problematic under EU competition law.47 The departure of these firms from the 
                                                 
46 See in this sense See in this sense Case 6/72 Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company Inc v 
Commission, EU:C:1973:22, para 26; Case C-95/04 P British Airways plc v Commission, EU:C:2007:166, para 106; 
and Joined Cases C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P and C-519/06 P GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v 
Commission EU:C:2009:610, para 63. 
47 See in particular Post Danmark I (n 38), para 22; TeliaSonera (n 26), para 64; and Deutsche Telekom (n 26), para 
253. The possible exceptions to this rule were considered in Post Danmark II (n 1), para 59. The Court noted in that 
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market is typically not attributable to the behaviour of the dominant firm. There is not, in other 
words, a causal link between the conduct and their exclusion. 
 In spite of these principles, there is considerable uncertainty about the instances in which an 
impact on competition triggers the application of Article 102 TFEU. The fundamental problem is 
that, in a sense, every practice influences, at least to some degree, the market structure and/or the 
behaviour of operators. Thus, one could argue that any behaviour that disadvantages rivals has an 
exclusionary effect. From this perspective, an aggressive price war, for instance, would have an 
anticompetitive effect insofar as it would make it more difficult for the rivals of the dominant firm to 
keep their clients, or to expand their business. The practice may even force them to lower their 
prices and thus to reduce their profitability. Similarly, a rebate scheme that requires the customers of 
a dominant firm to buy, say, 50% of their needs from it can also be said to have exclusionary effects 
insofar as it prevents rival suppliers from competing for the whole of the demand of these 
customers, and may force them to find alternative ways to sell their products. However, it is also 
possible to take a different perspective, and argue that only practices that harm rivals’ ability and 
incentive to compete are exclusionary. In such a case, a mere disadvantage to rivals would not be 
sufficient to trigger intervention. 
 The case law is not entirely unambiguous about which of these two approaches more 
accurately reflects the meaning of effects in the context of Article 102 TFEU. Some passages can be 
interpreting as suggesting that, indeed, any disadvantage to rivals is sufficient to trigger the prima 
facie prohibition. There are rulings that suggest that an anticompetitive effect exists where rival 
entry is made ‘more difficult, or impossible’ as a result of the behaviour of the dominant firm.48 
Similarly, in Tomra, the Court held that rivals of a dominant firm ‘should have the opportunity to 
                                                                                                                                                               
judgment that there may be instances in which the emergence of an equally efficient competitor is precluded by the 
regulatory framework and the features of the relevant market. In particular, it referred to a situation in which the 
dominant operator enjoys ‘structural advantages conferred, inter alia, by that undertaking’s statutory monopoly, which 
applied to 70% of mail on the relevant market’. 
48 See for instance the Case C-95/04 P British Airways (n 46), para 68; Deutsche Telekom (n 26), para 177; 
TeliaSonera (n 26), para 63; and Post Danmark II (n 1), para 42. 
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benefit from whatever degree of competition is possible on the market and competitors should be 
able to compete on the merits for the entire market and not just for a part of it’.49 Since intense 
competition makes it more difficult for rivals to remain on the market, one could claim that the 
requisite level of effects is satisfied virtually in every instance. 
 It is possible to argue convincingly, however, that the notion of effects does not simply refer 
to any disadvantage faced by competitors. To begin with, there are several cases that show that not 
every practice that makes it ‘more difficult’ for rivals to compete is necessarily a violation of Article 
102 TFEU. The policy of selective price cuts examined by the Court in Post Danmark I, for 
instance, was not found to have exclusionary effects, even though it made it more difficult for its 
main rival to remain on the market and reach its customers.50 The fact that this rival retained its 
ability and incentive to compete appeared to be sufficient to exclude a finding of abuse.51 The same 
conclusion can be drawn from Deutsche Telekom and TeliaSonera. By definition, a ‘margin 
squeeze’ makes it more difficult for the rivals of the dominant firm to compete on the relevant 
downstream market. This was in fact the argument made by the Commission in its decision in 
Deutsche Telekom.52 However, the Court expressly rejected that evidence of a ‘margin squeeze’ 
suffices, in and of itself, to establish an abuse. It made it clear that it is necessary to show, in 
addition, that the practice has an exclusionary effect.53 Evidence of such an effect may be inferred, 
as pointed out above, from the fact that access to the infrastructure is indispensable for rivals to 
compete on the relevant downstream market.54 
                                                 
49 Tomra (n 14), para 42. 
50 Unsurprisingly, this is a point that was raised by the Commission and other participants in the proceedings. See in 
this sense Opinion of AG Mengozzi in Case C-209/10 Post Danmark A/S v Konkurrencerådet, EU:C:2011:342 (‘Post 
Danmark I’), para 52. 
51 See above, notes 38 and 39. 
52 Deutsche Telekom AG (Case COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579) Commission Decision 2003/707/EC [2003] OJ 
L263/9, paras 176-180. 
53 Deustche Telekom (n 26), para 250. The Court held that ‘the General Court correctly rejected the Commission’s 
arguments to the effect that the very existence of a pricing practice of a dominant undertaking which leads to the 
margin squeeze of its equally efficient competitors constitutes an abuse within the meaning of Article [102 TFEU], 
and that it is not necessary for an anti-competitive effect to be demonstrated’. 
54 See above, note 27. 
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 Another reason in favour of the latter understanding of the notion of effects is that it more 
accurately reflects how the anticompetitive impact of a practice is assessed in other areas of EU 
competition law. It is submitted that it would be difficult to justify giving different meanings to the 
notion of effects depending on the provision at stake. In the context of Article 101(1) TFEU a 
restrictive effect justifying intervention is more than a disadvantage or a mere difficulty to compete. 
The example of Delimitis has already been mentioned above. The analysis of effects sketched by the 
Court in that judgment aims at establishing whether access to the market is foreclosed, that is, 
whether rivals would have the ability and incentive to compete in spite of the cumulative impact of 
exclusive dealing obligations.55 The assessment comprises the coverage of the practice (that is, the 
number of customers bound by exclusivity agreements) and whether it is possible for the firm to 
enter the market through vertical integration. 
The same is true in the context of merger control. As the Commission explains at length in 
its Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, it is not sufficient to show that the rivals of the merged entity 
would be disadvantaged (and this even when the merged entity holds a dominant position on one of 
the markets). Remedial action would only be justified where rivals’ ability and incentive to compete 
would be reduced as a result of the transaction. For instance, the Commission noted in 
Microsoft/Skype that rivals could be disadvantaged in various ways by Microsoft, which enjoyed a 
dominant position on the market for operating systems for PCs.56 An analysis of the features and 
dynamics of the relevant markets showed, however, that the operation would not harm these rivals’ 
ability to thrive. Thus, the Commission cleared the merger without conditions. The GC validated the 
analysis of the Commission when challenged by Cisco Systems.57 
 
 
 
                                                 
55 See above, note 18. 
56 Microsoft/Skype (Case No COMP/M.6281) Commission Decision of 7 October 2011. 
57 Case T-79/12 Cisco Systems, Inc and Messagenet SpA v Commission, EU:T:2013:635. 
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4.2.Appreciability is independent of the notion of effects 
 
The Court will have to clarify in the future what the notion of effects means in the context of 
Article 102 TFEU. It is clear, however, that the question does not depend on the applicability of the 
de minimis doctrine to abuse of dominance cases. It is independent from the issue of appreciability, 
and should not be conflated with it. As a result, it would be wrong to infer from Post Danmark II, as 
some authors have done,58 that any disadvantage caused to rivals is sufficient to trigger the 
application of Article 102 TFEU. Evidence that the two issues are independent from one another can 
be found in Post Danmark II itself. The Court went in detail into the factors that need to be 
considered when establishing the exclusionary impact of a system of standardised rebate schemes. 
This analysis would be plain irrelevant if a mere disadvantage on rivals sufficed to apply Article 102 
TFEU. Inevitably, a system of standardised rebates applying over a period of one year places rivals 
at a disadvantage. 
 Arguably, Post Danmark II is best interpreted in light of Delimitis. It has already been 
explained that, in the latter, the Court neatly distinguished between the issue of effects and that of 
appreciability. The foreclosure effects of exclusive dealing obligations are to be established first, 
followed by an assessment of the appreciability of the contribution made by the supplier to such 
effects. Against this background, it would seem that what the Court held in Post Danmark II is 
simply that it is not necessary to assess the second step in the context of Article 102 TFEU. When 
the market is foreclosed as a result of the obligations imposed by the dominant firm, it seems 
unnecessary to establish that such obligations make an appreciable contribution to foreclosure. 
When a dominant firm is involved, and exclusion is established, appreciability can indeed be safely 
                                                 
58 James S Venit, ‘Making Sense of Post Danmark I and II: Keeping the Hell Fires Well Stoked and Burning’ (2016) 7 
Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 165. 
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assumed to exist. This is also the factor that distinguishes the analysis of restrictions under Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU. 
 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
It is now clear that some potentially abusive practices are prohibited only insofar as they are likely 
to have an anticompetitive effect. Because these practices do not fall under the ‘by object’ category, 
it is necessary to engage in a case-by-case assessment of their impact on competition. It is natural 
that, at this stage, some aspects relating to this assessment have not been explored in sufficient 
detail. The issue of de minimis and appreciability is one of them. This piece shows that this question 
tends to be conflated with the need to show the likelihood of an anticompetitive effect, and with the 
very meaning of the notion of effect. As a result, some commentators have come to the conclusion 
that the Court, by holding that it is not necessary to establish the serious or appreciable nature of the 
impact of a practice on competition, it was in practice ruling out the need to establish an effect in 
any meaningful way. 
 It is submitted that this reading of Post Danmark II is inaccurate. What the Court held in 
that judgment is that it is not justified to set a de minimis threshold in the context of Article 102 
TFEU. It did not hold that it is not necessary to establish an exclusionary effect, or that any 
disadvantage on rivals is exclusionary. Thus, where a ‘by effect’ practice is unlikely to have an 
anticompetitive impact (as is the case, for instance, where its coverage is very limited), it falls 
outside the scope of Article 102 TFEU. The fact that it is not necessary to establish the serious or 
appreciable nature of the effect is not a relevant consideration in this regard. This looks like the 
most reasonable interpretation of Post Danmark II. Similarly, the de minimis doctrine refers to the 
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insignificance of the effects, but does not provide a definition of what an anticompetitive effect is. 
There are reasons to believe that an impact on competition is more than a mere disadvantage. The 
fact that the rival of the dominant firm was able to win back its customers in Post Danmark I, for 
instance, was sufficient to rule out a finding of abuse, even though the below-cost pricing 
campaign at stake in the case was capable of having exclusionary effects. Article 101 TFEU and 
EU merger control case law approach the notion of effects in the same way. From the perspective 
of consistency, it would be reasonable to attach the same meaning to concepts across EU 
competition law provisions. 
 It would seem that many of the discussions around appreciability and de minimis in the 
context of Article 102 TFEU do not really concern this issue. When commentators regret that 
some practices – like exclusive dealing and loyalty rebates – are abusive even when they are 
unlikely to have an exclusionary effect, they regret, in reality, that these practices are deemed 
abusive by object and thus that they are prima facie prohibited irrespective of their impact on 
competition. As explained above, there are powerful reasons to argue that the ‘by object’ label is 
not appropriate for some of the most common categories of potentially abusive practices, 
including the abovementioned two. However, that question, which will be addressed by the Court 
in Intel, is a separate one. As Article 101 TFEU case law shows, the qualification of a practice as 
restrictive by object or effect, is different from the question of whether anticompetitive effects are 
appreciable. 
